Tanzania
Tanzania currently has no specific legislation to counter disinformation. However, there are several laws that include potential restrictions on disinformation: the Cybercrimes Act, 2015, the Electronic and Postal Communications Act, 2010 and the Media Services Act No.12 of 2016, and the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations, 2020 (which replaced the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations, 2018).
These laws raise several concerns from a human rights perspective. They are loosely-defined in their scope, meaning that authorities could interpret them as giving them power to restrict a wide range of speech; and they pursue aims which would not be considered “legitimate” according to international human rights standards—for example, restricting speech when it is intended to threaten or insult a person or the public (Cyber Crimes Act No. 14 of 2015) and prohibiting “rumors for the purpose of ridicule” (Electronic and Postal Communications Regulations, 2020). These laws also carry penalties which are potentially disproportionate in their severity, and may result in a chilling effect on freedom of expression.
We assess these laws individually in detail below. We also assess the enforcement of these laws in response to disinformation.
N.B. In March 2019, the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) directed Tanzania to amend the Media Services Act. The EACJ noted that the wording in section 50(1)(c) of the Act – “threatening the interests of defence, public safety, public order, the economic interests of the United Republic, public morality or public health” – was too broad and imprecise to enable a journalist or other person to regulate their actions, and held that this section as well as many others violated the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community and the right to freedom of expression. In August, three Tanzanian human rights organisations filed a lawsuit against the government of Tanzania for contempt of court at the EACJ for its failure to amend the Media Services Act.
No. Section 16 of the Act creates a criminal offence of publishing information or data in a computer system, knowing that it is false, deceptive, misleading or inaccurate, and where they have an intention to defame, threaten, abuse, insult or otherwise deceive or mislead the public, or to counsel the commission of an offence. It is not clear how to determine whether information is “false”. Section 16 therefore does not provide sufficient guidance for individuals and gives an overly wide degree of discretion to those charged with the enforcement of this law.
No. Section 16 appears to be targeted at protecting the rights of others and upholding public order, which are legitimate aims. However, this provision also appears to pursue illegitimate aims as it restricts speech which is intended to mislead or deceive without any other harm being caused.
Yes. Section 16 explicitly limits liability to instances where the individual knew that the information was false, deceptive, misleading or inaccurate. The individual would not be liable if they reasonably believed the information to be true.
Yes. This is a criminal offence and will be decided by a court of law.
No. Violation of Section 16 will result in a minimum fine of five million shillings and a minimum prison sentence of three years, or both. There does not appear to be a maximum penalty imposed. These penalties are likely to be disproportionate, particularly for less serious offences where little or no harm actually occurs.
Yes, but only under certain circumstances. Section 40 provides that access providers will not be liable for third party content in electronic communications when they do not initiate the transmission, do not select the receiver of the transmission, and do not select or modify the information contained in the transmission. Section 41 provides that a hosting provider is not liable for illegal information stored at the request of a user if they immediately remove it upon receiving a removal order from a competent authority, or immediately inform the relevant authority when otherwise made aware of illegal information. Section 44 provides that a search engine provider is not liable for search results, on condition that the search engine provider does not initiate the transmission, does not select the receiver of the transmission, and does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission.
Section 45 indicates that a service provider who fails to take action on a take-down notification received shall be charged as a person who initiated the contents. These take-down notifications may come from individuals, and if a service provider fails to act upon the notification, then the individual may notify a “competent authority”. That competent authority may then order the service provider to act on the notification or take any other measure to resolve the matter.
It therefore would appear that intermediary liability is not limited to circumstances where an intermediary has intervened in content moderation, or refused to obey a court order. These provisions go beyond such requirements and extend liability in other circumstances. It is also unclear whether the “competent authority” referenced in Section 45 is limited to an independent and impartial body such as a court.
No. Regulation 16 prohibits persons from publishing any “prohibited content” or facilitating user access to prohibited content. “Prohibited content” includes, amongst other types of content:
- content which threatens public security and national safety, including rumors for the purpose of ridicule, abuse or harming the reputation, prestige or status of the United Republic, the flag or national anthem;
- false content which is likely to mislead or deceive the public, except where it is clearly pre-stated that the content is satire and parody, fiction, and preceded by a statement that the content is not factual.
It is not clear how to determine whether information is “false” or a “rumor”. As such, regulation 16 fails to provide clear guidance for online service providers or users, and provides an overly wide degree of discretion to those charged with the enforcement of this law.
No. Speech should only be restricted where some clear, objective public harm might be caused. Some of the aims pursued by Regulation 16 appear targeted at the legitimate aims of protecting public order, public health, and protecting the rights of others. However, there are broad categories of speech or content prohibited under Regulation 16 which are not aimed at pursuing these. Restrictions on content that ridicule the country or are likely to mislead or deceive the public, for example, do not pursue legitimate aims according to international human rights standards.
No.
No. Violation of these regulations are dealt with by the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority. They are charged with taking action against non-compliance, including to order removal of or bar access to prohibited content.
This is unlikely. Regulation 21 provides that a person who violates any regulation, including Regulation 16, will be liable for a minimum fine of five million Tanzanian shilling or a minimum prison sentence of one year, or both. These minimum sanctions are likely to be disproportionate in most circumstances, particularly when no harm actually occurs.
Yes. Regulation 9 provides that all online content providers must ensure that online content does not contravene the provisions of any written law, and Regulation 20 requires online content providers to ensure that all prohibited content is removed within twelve hours of being notified.
No. Section 118(a) of the Electronic and Postal Communications Act, 2010 creates a criminal offence of using network or content services to knowingly create, solicit or initiate the transmission of communication which is, among other things, false with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person. It is not clear how to determine what is considered “false”. This provision is also very broad in scope. Section 118(a) does not provide sufficient guidance for individuals and gives an overly wide degree of discretion to those charged with the enforcement of this law.
No. Speech should only be restricted where some clear, objective public harm might be caused. Section 118(a) may be targeted at protecting the rights of others. However, the vague construction of this provision, including its broad scope and lack of clarity on thresholds, indicates that not all restrictions would pursue legitimate aims.
Yes. Section 118(a) requires an individual to knowingly transmit false information.
Yes. This is a criminal offence and will be decided by a court of law.
This is unlikely. Violation of Section 118(a) will result in a fine not less than five million Tanzanian shillings or imprisonment for a term not less than twelve months, or both. Individuals will continue to be liable for a fine of seven hundred and fifty thousand Tanzanian shillings for every day during which the offence is continued after conviction. These minimum sanctions are likely to be disproportionate in most circumstances, particularly when no harm actually occurs. Furthermore, any sanction would automatically be disproportionate if made in pursuance of an illegitimate aim.
N/A.
No. The applicable provisions are vague and broadly constructed. Section 50(1)(a) of the Act makes it an offence for any person to use a media service for the purposes of publishing information which is intentionally or recklessly falsified in a manner which threatens the interests of defence, public safety, public order, the economic interests of the country, public morality or public health; or is injurious to the reputation, rights and freedom of other persons. Section 50(1)(b) prohibits the use of a media service to publish information which is maliciously or fraudulently fabricated. Section 50(1)(d) makes it an offence to publish a statement when knowing it to be false or without reasonable grounds for believing it to be true. Section 50(2) further criminalises, inter alia, disseminating false information without justification.
Section 54 criminalises the publication of any false statement, rumour or report which is likely to cause fear and alarm to the public or to disturb the public peace.
Each of these provisions requires further clarification. For instance, it is difficult to determine what information is “false”, “falsified”, or the scope of what is considered to be in the interests of defence, public safety and the economic interests of the country.
No. Speech should only be restricted where some clear, objective public harm might be caused. Some of the restrictions in Sections 50 and 54 appear to be targeted at protecting national security, public order, public health, public morals and protecting the rights of others. However, the broad scope of these offences means that other restrictions would be in pursuance of other aims which are not legitimate. For example, the scope of Section 50 covers information which is merely false, without any harm having been caused.
Yes. Section 50(1)(d) limits liability to the publication of false statements when the publisher knew it to be false. Section 54(2) provides a defence if the accused is able to prove that, prior to publication, they took measures to verify the accuracy of the statement and this led them to reasonably believe that the publication was true.
Yes. These are criminal offences and will be decided by a court of law.
Potentially. Violation of Section 50 will result in a fine between five and twenty million shillings or imprisonment for three to five years, or to both. Violation of Section 54 will result in a fine between ten and twenty million shillings or imprisonment for four to six years, or to both. If the maximum fine and prison sentence are imposed without taking into account the circumstances of the offence, then sanctions may be disproportionate. The minimum sanctions are also likely to be disproportionate in most circumstances, particularly when no harm actually occurs. Any sanction would be disproportionate if made in pursuance of an illegitimate aim.
N/A.
On 22 August 2019, Joseph Gandye, an investigative journalist at Watetezi TV, was arrested for allegedly disseminating false information. The action stems from reporting on police brutality against young people in police custody, which included accusations against police officers of having forced six young people in custody to “sodomize each other”. He was reportedly released several days later and it is unclear whether any official charges had been filed.
Yes. The arrest was reportedly based on suspected violation of Section 16 of the Cybercrimes Act, 2015.
No. Restricting speech may be legitimate if made in the pursuance of a legitimate aim, including for respect of the rights or reputations of others, for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals. Here, the arrest does not seem to be in pursuance of a legitimate aim, but instead to discredit and discourage his reporting on wrongdoing by law enforcement. This would therefore not constitute a legitimate aim under international human rights law.
No. The action taken by the government was not in pursuance of a legitimate aim and was therefore unnecessary and disproportionate.
Journalist Sebastian Atilio was arrested in September 2019 for allegedly spreading false news on a WhatsApp group popularly known for commentary on politics and social issues. The information in question related to a claim that villagers in the Iringa region of Tanzania were potentially facing eviction and relocation to pave way for the Unilever Tea Tanzania Company Limited. The journalist was held for nearly three weeks until released on bail. The charges were later withdrawn in March, 2020.
Yes, the journalist was arrested and charged with publishing false information contrary to Section 16 of the Cyber Crimes Act, 2015, and for performing journalist activities without a permit from the Tanzania Journalists Board contrary to Section 50(2)(b) of the Media Services Act, 2016.
No. Restricting speech may be legitimate if made in the pursuance of a legitimate aim, including for respect of the rights or reputations of others, for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals. Here, the restriction does not seem to be in pursuance of a legitimate aim. Instead, reports suggest that the journalist was being prosecuted for spreading information damaging to investors and to Tanzania’s ruling party.
No. The action was unnecessary and disproportionate as it pursued illegitimate aims.
The Mwananchi newspaper was banned from publishing online for six months and fined five million Tanzanian shillings over alleged publication of false news in April 2020. It was alleged that the newspaper had circulated an online video in which Tanzanian President John Magufuli was shown buying fish in an open market. His act was considered irresponsible given the prevalence of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Yes, the action was based on a violation of Regulation 12(l) of the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations, 2018. Regulation 12 contained a similar prohibition against “prohibited content” as per Regulation 16 in the 2020 Regulations.
No. Restricting speech may be legitimate if made in the pursuance of a legitimate aim, including for respect of the rights or reputations of others, for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or moral. Here, reports do not suggest that the authorities were concerned about ramifications of this video for public health and it appears that this restriction was politically motivated.
No. The action was likely made in pursuance of an illegitimate aim, so any response would be unnecessary and disproportionate. Even if this action were to be in pursuance of a legitimate aim, the heavy fine and long publication ban would be disproportionate.
On 5 September 2021, Tanzania’s Information Services Department issued a month-long suspension of the Raia Mwema newspaper, citing several articles they had published relating to government figures or policies.
Yes. The suspension was made under Section 52 of the Media Services Act relating to seditious intent and Section 54 relating to the publication of false statements or rumours likely to cause public disturbance.
No. Restricting speech may be legitimate if made in the pursuance of a legitimate aim, including for respect of the rights or reputations of others, for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals. There are no indications that the stories published by Raia Mwema cited in the suspension decision posed any clear, objective public harm, and reports indicate that the suspension was aimed at suppressing political criticism, which would not constitute a legitimate aim.
No. In the absence of a legitimate aim, any action taken would be unnecessary and disproportionate.
On August 11, 2021, Tanzania’s Information Services Department issued a 14-day suspension of Uhuru, a newspaper owned by the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) ruling party, following allegations that the paper had published a false and seditious report about the country’s president, Samia Suluhu Hassan. Earlier that day, Uhuru had published a front-page story alleging that Hassan did not intend to run for office during the next general election in 2025. The CCM distanced itself from the article, saying that it was false and that three senior managers at Uhuru had been suspended pending an investigation.
Yes. The suspension was made under 50(1)(a),(b),(d) and 52(d) of the 2016 Media Services Act, referring to the publication of false, falsified or fabricated information raising discontent or disaffection amongst the people of Tanzania.
No. Restricting speech may be legitimate if made in the pursuance of a legitimate aim, including for respect of the rights or reputations of others, for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals. There are no indications that the story published about Hassan posed any concrete harm to her rights or reputation, nor that the story posed any clear, objective public harm. It is more likely that the suspension was politically motivated and therefore was not in pursuance of a legitimate aim.
No. The action was likely made in pursuance of an illegitimate aim, so any response would be unnecessary and disproportionate.
On 6 July 2020, the Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority announced the suspension of Kwanza Online TV for 11 months for allegedly “generating and disseminating biased, misleading and disruptive content”. This action was taken in connection to the outlet’s sharing of a US embassy health alert on Instagram about the Tanzanian’s government’s failure to publish any Covid-19 figures. This follows a previous suspension of Kwanza Online TV by the authorities in September 2019 for six months, also for allegedly publishing misleading information.
Yes, the action was based on charges of sharing false information in contravention of Section 12 of the Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations, 2018. Regulation 12 contained a similar prohibition against “prohibited content” as per Regulation 16 in the 2020 Regulations.
No. Restricting speech may be legitimate if made in the pursuance of a legitimate aim, including for respect of the rights or reputations of others, for the protection of national security or of public order, or of public health or morals. The Vice-President of the Tanzania Communication Regulatory Authority claimed that the offending content was designed to cause panic and damage the national economy. However, reports suggest that the action was aimed at suppression of Kwanza Online TV’s criticism of the government’s handling of COVID-19. This would therefore not constitute a legitimate aim under international human rights law.
No. The action was likely made in pursuance of an illegitimate aim, so any response would be unnecessary and disproportionate. Even if this action were to be in pursuance of a legitimate aim, the long-term ban constitutes a considerable and disproportionate restriction on freedom of expression.